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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KATHRYN MYRNA NEWMEYER, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
JEDDY PAUL NEWMEYER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 19183 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is a divorce case. The defendant-appellant, 
hereinafter referred to as defendant, seeks review of the 
district court's decisions concerning the property distribution, 
alimony, and attorney's fees. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This case was tried on February 28th, 1983, in the Third 
Judicial District Court in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
before the Honorable Jay E. Banks. After trial, a divorce was 
granted to the plaintiff. 
The trial court awarded the plaintiff the parties' former 
marital abode. The defendant was awarded an equitable lien 
JJ01nst said home in the amount of Thirty Two Thousand Six 
6 
Hundred Six Dollars ($32,606.00). The plaintiff was awar~ed 
the care, custody and control of the parties' minor child, 
CAROLYN, and Two Hundred Dollars per month child support. The 
plaintiff was also awarded One Dollar ($1.00) per year as 
alimony, a 1973 Ford Maverick automobile, and her Seventeen 
Thousand Dollar ($17,000.00) personal savings account. 
Additionally the plaintiff was awarded the income tax deduction 
for the support of the minor child, CAROLYN, for tax year 1982, 
a permanent injunction, enjoining the defendant from having 
contact with her at any time, at any place, or in any manner, 
except for purposes of arranging visitation, and attorney's fees 
in the amount of One Thousand Four Hundred Twenty Three Dollars 
($1,423.00). 
The defendant was awarded an equitable lien in the parties' 
real estate in the amount of Thirty Two Thousand Six Hundred 
Six Dollars ($32,606.00), a 1971 Ford Maverick automobile, his 
share of the parties' personal property which had been previously 
divided between them and was stipulated to at the outset of 
trial, along with Seven Thousand Dollars ($7,000.00) in his 
savings account and his pension and profit sharing plan, free 
and clear of any claim of the plaintiff. The defendant was also 
awarded the tax deduction for the support of the parties' 
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1aughter, CAROLYN, for the tax year 1983 and subsequent years. 
The defendant was ordered to maintain his health insurance on 
the parties' minor child. The parties had no marital debt at 
the time of trial. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiff respondent, Kathryn Myrna Newmeyer, 
hereinafter referred to as plaintiff, believing that this matter 
was fully, openly and fairly decided at trial, requests that 
this court affirm the decision of the trial court below in all 
particulars. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were married on the 26th day of December, 1962. 
They have one minor female child who was approximately twelve 
years of age at the time of trial. The parties bought three 
homes during their marriage. The first home, located at 382 
Vitas Avenue in Salt Lake County, was purchased six months after 
their marriage for Ten Thousand Six Hundred Forty Five Dollars 
:sJ0,645.00J (Tr. at 19). The plaintiff paid Five Thousand Five 
8 
Hundred Dollars ($5,500.00) of the down payment on said home 
(Tr. at 20), the defendant and his father together, paid One 
Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($1,500.00) of the down payment 
(Tr. at 20), leaving a balance owing of Three Thousand Six 
Hundred Forty Five Dollars ($3,645.00). (There is a dispute 
in the testimony concerning these amounts. To the best of his 
recollection, the defendant claims he and his father put down 
Two Thousand Dollars on the Vitas Avenue home, and that the 
plaintiff only put down Twenty One Hundred Dollars) (Tr. at 
205). Both parties worked at the time and contributed equally 
to the Sixty Four Dollar ($64.00) per month payments due on the 
remaining Three Thousand Six Hundred Forty Five Dollar 
($3,645.00) balance until paid (Tr. at 20 and 21). There is 
also a dispute in the testimony on this point. The defendant 
claims he made multiple principal payments on the first house 
(as much as four or five times the principal amount) on occasion 
(Tr. at 206). Even if true, this is not significant in contrast 
with the total contributions by the parties and total equities 
involved as is outlined below. 
The parties lived in the Vitas home approximately seven 
years (Tr. at 21) when they moved to 3924 South 10th East, in 
Salt Lake County (Tr. at 21). The purchase price of this house 
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w~s Twenty One Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($21,500.00) (Tr. at 
21). The transaction for the acquisition of the 10th East home 
was in the nature of a trade (Tr. at 21). The parties herein 
traded up and the seller of the 10th East home traded down, but 
the seller received cash compensation from the parties herein 
to make up for the difference between the value of the two 
homes. Within three months of the trade on the 10th East 
p(operty, the plaintiff received Five Thousand Five Hundred 
Dollars ($5,500.00) from her brother (Tr. at 22). Three Thousand 
Dollars ($3,000.00) of said Five Thousand Five Hundred Dollars 
($5,500.00) received by the plaintiff from her brother was paid 
by the plaintiff on the house to the party with whom they had 
traded, and within one (1) year the plaintiff additionally paid 
another Five Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($5,500.00) to that 
same party. Said Five Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($5,500.00) 
was received by the plaintiff out of the closing of her mother's 
estate, her mother having then recently died (Tr. at 23).The 
parties subsequently made four payments of One Hundred Twenty 
Three Dollars ($123.00) completing payment for the house on 10th 
East (Tr. at 24). 
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3. The defendant paid Five Thousand One 
Hundred T..,enty Nine Dollars and Fifty 
Five Cents ($5,129.55) from his savin.Js 
account (Tr. ctt 26). 
The plaintiff thus invested additional cash of approximately 
Forty Seven Thousand Dollars ($47,000.00) in the Fortuna home 
3t the time of closing (Tr. at 27). 
The parties lived in the Fortuna home from 1979 until they 
be;:3me separated in 1982. Trial in this matter ..,as held in 
f 0 bruary of 1983. 
There is contradictory testimony in the transcript 
~ancerning the defendant's ne.., cash outlay on the Fortuna home 
~~ich ..,as purchased in 1979, (the third house listed on page 
9 1. The plaintiff testified that the defendant pctid at clo~ing 
"nly Five Thousand One Hundred Twenty Nine Dollars and Fifty 
r1'1e Cents ($5,129.55) in ne.., money on the Fortuna home. (Tr. at 
'" Yo..,ever, the defendant, although he admitted not being 
able to remember, said he thought he had contributed a total 
•F 1bout Twelve Thousand Dollars ($12,000.00) to..,ards the Fortuna 
(Tr. at 1271, (d<>fendant's statement of fact on this 
~1-:: i:; in .::irrorJ 't is clear from the transcript ..,hen ta~en 
1 2 
as a whole, however, that the defendant was mistaken about tho 
Twelve Thousand Dollar ($12,000.00) amount. Apparently the 
purchasers of the Newmeyer's home on 10th East (second home) 
did not have enough down-payment money to qualify for financing. 
(Tr. at 135). It appears from the testimony (Tr. at 136), that 
the real price the parties wanted for the house was Fifty Two 
Thousand Dollars ($52,000.00). The defendant lent the purchasers 
Five Thousand Four Hundred Dollars ($5,400.00), and then raised 
the price of the home to Fifty Seven Thousand Four Hundred 
Dollars ($57,400.00). The purchasers then had a sufficient 
down-payment to qualify for a loan and purchased the home. The 
Newmeyers were not out anything because that same money loaned 
was given back to them at closing, minus the costs of sale and 
real estate commissions. In any event the Newmeyers netted out 
of the sale Fifty Four Thousand Three Hundred Seventy Two Dollars 
and Eighteen Cents ($54,372.18) (Tr. at 25), when in fact they 
would have agreed to sell the house for Fifty Two Thousand 
Dollars ($52,000.00) to a buyer who could have qualified on his 
own. The defendant's real cash contribution towards the purchase 
of the Fortuna home was probably something more than the Five 
Thousand One Hundred Twenty Nine Dollars ($5,129.00), listed 
on page 11, source (3), but was not further explained at trial. 
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The plaintiff and defendant both had experts testify at 
the time of trial concerning the value of the home. The 
testimony by each expert was based on a personal examination 
of the Fortuna home and premises and written appraisals which 
had been prepared shortly before trial. The plaintiff's 
appraiser, Mr. Paul Lund, testified that the home was worth One 
Hundred Twelve Thousand Dollars ($112,000.00) (Tr. at 51). The 
defendant's appraiser, Mr. Blankenship, testified that the home 
was worth One Hundred Twenty Two Thousand Dollars ($122,000.00) 
(Tr. at 50). Close examination of the transcript reveals that 
Three Thousand Six Hundred Dollars ($3,600.00) of the difference 
between the two (2) appraisals ($112,000 vs. $122,000), is a 
difference of opinion as to the value of an additional 
recreational vehicle garage which had been built behind the 
house. The defendant's appraiser testified that this garage was 
of significant value because most people looking for a home in 
the area of the parties' home would want a garage for 
recreational vehicles. The plaintiff's appraiser did not agree 
and valued the garage as a storage area only. 
The plaintiff had approximately Seventeen Thousand Dollars 
1$17,000.00) in her personal savings account at the time of 
However, in contradiction to the facts as stated by the 
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defendant in his brief, only Four Thousand Dollars ($4,000.UUJ 
of said Seventeen Thousand Dollars ($17,000.00) in her savings 
was from her parents' estates, the remaining Thirteen Thousand 
Dollars ($13,000.00) was from monies earned by her at work and 
put in savings during the marriage (Tr. at 37). The plaintiff 
did not get credit for the inheritance money twice as claimed 
by the defendant in Point II of his Brief. The defendant had 
Seven Thousand Dollars ($7,000.00) in his savings at the time 
of trial (Tr. at 37). The value of the defendant's retirement 
account (awarded to him) was unknown at trial, however, the 
defendant had been working at Utah Transit Authority under the 
retirement plan for 12 or 13 years (Tr. at 126). 
The parties kept their finances separate throughout the 
entirety of the marriage (Tr. at 38). The defendant worked full 
time during the marriage (Tr. at 121, 122, 124). The plaintiff 
worked during much of the marriage, and full time since 1975 
(Tr. at 39, 40). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
The defendant cites various cases in support of two 
well known propositions of law. The first is that this court 
may review both questions of fact as well as questions of law. 
Hansen vs. Hansen, 537 P.2d 491 (Utah, 1975). The second is 
that although the trial courts findings, judgments and decisions, 
especially in a divorce case, are looked upon with favor on 
review by the Supreme Court, they are subject to review, and 
the exercise of the trial court's discretion is not without 
limitation. DeRose vs. DeRose, 19 Utah 2d 77, 426 P.2d 221 
11967). This Court has ruled on many occassions that it will 
defer to the judgment findings and decrees of the district court, 
however, where there is a clear abuse of discretion on the part 
of the trial court, or where the findings of fact are not 
supported by the preponderance of the evidence, this Court may 
substitute it's judgment for that of the lower court, and may 
alter or amend the decision of the lower court or may remand 
'he matter for further proceedings as appropriate. Christensen 
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vs. Christensen, 21 Utah 2d 261, 444 P.2d 511 (1968), §_raziano 
vs. Graziano, 7 Utah 2d 187, 321 P.2d 931 (1958), Hansen vs. 
!!ansen, 537 p.2d 491 (Utah, 1975), Watson vs. Watson, 561 
P.2d 1072 (Utah 1977). 
With these two propositions of law the plaintiff does 
not disagree. 
The trial court was not arbitrary or capricious , nor 
did it abuse it's discretion. A review of the evidence 
demonstrates that the preponderance of the evidence supports 
the property distribution made by the court, especially as to 
the parties' relative equitable interests in the real estate 
acquired by them during their marriage. 
POINT II. THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE LOWER COURTS 
DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY, INCLUDING THE DISTRIBUTION OF EQUITY 
IN THE PARTIES' FORMER MARITAL ABODE. 
The parties' home located at 3242 Fortuna Drive, Salt 
Lake County, was awarded to the plaintiff. She resides there 
with her minor child, Carolyn. There is no mortgage on the 
1 7 
hume. The court found the value of said home to be One Hundred 
Seventeen Thousand Dollars ($117,000.00), the defendant was 
awarded an equitable lien in the amount of Thirty Two Thousand 
Six Hundred Six Dollars ($32,606.00). 
A. The District Court Was Within The Limits Of It's 
Discretion In Finding The Fortuna Home To Be Worth $117,000.00. 
As is recited in the .Facts portion of this Brief, both 
plaintiff and defendant produced expert witnesses at the time 
of trial (Tr. at 2, 48). These gentlemen were both qualified 
as fee appraisers of real estate. Again as is indicated in the 
facts, the plaintiff's appraiser submitted a written appraisal, 
which he testified in support of, that the parties' marital abode 
at that time was worth One Hundred Twelve Thousand Dollars 
($112,000.00). The defendant's expert, testified that that same 
house was worth One Hundred Twenty Two Thousand Dollars 
($122,000.00). Both written appraisals were admitted in evidence 
by the court. The largest single discrepancy between the two 
appraisals, as is detailed above, was as to the value of a second 
recreational vehicle garage. 
When the court published it's findings concerning the 
critical issues subsequent to trial it indicated that it found 
18 
the value of the home to be One AundrPd SeventPen Thousand 
Dollars ($117,000.00). Defendant complains on appeal that said 
finding as to value of the home by the court below is "a mere 
compromise", and "does not represent an exercise of discretion, 
but is an arbitrary and capricious act of the trial court." 
The plaintiff disagrees. The court did not at the time of 
publishing it's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, or at 
any other time, indicate it's reasons, or the mental processes 
gone through in arriving at the value it found for the home. 
The plaintiff assumes that the court simply split the 
difference. The lower court may well have done, but if so, only 
after having listened to the testimony of the experts in support 
of their written appaisals, and having observed their demeanor, 
and their ability to explain their different conclusions, and 
having weighed the relative weight to assign to each appraisal. 
Neither party, nor counsel, has any information or 
knowledge as to why Judge Banks valued the Fortuna home at One 
Hundred Seventeen Thousand Dollars ($117,000.00), but assuming 
that he did his job correctly as the finder of fact, and weighed 
the evidence presented by both appraisers, and assigned the 
appropriate weight to give to that evidence in his mind, neither 
counsel for the defendant-appellant or plaintiff-respondent can 
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JY from the transcript, or from any other source, that the 
decision by Judge Banks was arbitrary or capricious, or an abuse 
of discretion. 
The assertion by the defendant that the trial court 
must accept completely the testimony of either one appraiser 
or the other, and totally discount the opinion of one or the 
other, is clearly not correct. The District Court may, and in 
many cases obviously does, compromise, and correctly so in making 
findings in these matters. 
B. The District Court Was Within The Limits Of It's 
Discretion In Awarding The Defendant A Lien In the Amount Of 
$32,606.00 
The defendant-appellant recites at some length on pages 
9, 10 and 11 the arithmatic process it supposes the trial court 
went through in arriving at the equitable lien figure awarded 
to the defendant. 
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law along with 
a decree, approved by defendant's counsel were signed by Judge 
Banks. No more detail was given by the court concerning the 
court's calculations, or the manner or method by which the court 
l 0 tPrrnined what the defendant's equitable lien should be, than 
20 
is revealed in those approved and published Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law. All theories as to the arithmat1c 
process discussed on pages 9, 10 and 11 of the defendant's brief 
are merely speculation. 
A review of the testimony as it is outlined in the 
transcript is helpful in demonstrating that the court's decision 
was clearly within the discretionary limits enjoyed by the 
district court in deciding these matters, and that the award 
of an equitable lien to the defendant in the amount of Thirty 
Two Thousand Six Hundred Six Dollars ($32,606.00) was not an 
abuse of discretion, nor an error of law. 
Without restating the facts portion of this brief, 
the relevant evidence concerning the real estate is outlined 
and summarized on the charts appearing below. These charts have 
been prepared from the statement of facts above, and are 
supported by the transcript. References to the transcript page 
numbers may be found in the statement of facts portion of this 
brief. 
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n t 1es first home 
Putchased in 1962 
G months after marriage 
Purchase price - $10,645.00 
382 VITAS AVENUE 
Plaintiff put down $ 5,500.00 
Defendant put down 1,500.00 
TOTAL down payment $ 7,000.00 
Purchase price $10,645.00 
LESS down payment 7,000.00 
Amount left to $ 3,645.00 
be paid in payments 
$3,645.00 to be paid off in $64.00 per 
month payments. Both parties 
contributed. 
Vitas home traded on hemp at 3924 South 10th East 
in approximately 1969. 
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Parties second home 
Purchased approximately 1969 
3924 South 1000 East 
Purchase Price - $21,500 
3924 South 10th East 
Parties gave Vitas home $ 
in trade 
Plaintiff's contribution 
from inherited land from 
father 
Plaintiff's contribution 
from mother's estate 
TOTAL down payment in 
form of trade and new 
cash by plaintiff 
PURCHASE PRICE 
LESS down payment 
Amount to be paid as 
payments 
s 
s 
$ 
11,950.00 
3,500.00 
5,500.00 
20,950.00 
21,500.00 
20,950.00 
550.00 
Second home on 10th East sold in 1979, moved to 3242 Fortuna 
23 
. "1 '"'s third home 
1,,,, cl1ased in 1979 
P11r·~hase price - $108,000.00 
The home purchased outright at closing. 
~Pver any debt owed by parties thereon. 
3242 Fortuna 
Actual net amount $ 
received by parties from 
sale of 10th East home 
54,375.18 
New cash amount 46,117.98 
contributed by plaintiff 
from her father's estate, 
mother's estate and personal 
savings account 
Actual amount new cash 
contributed by defendant 
from his savings account 
TOTAL $ 
5,129.55 
105,619.71 
Difference between purchase price of $108,000.00 and $105,619.71 
was never expl~ined at trial 
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PROPERTY 
Vitas Home 
10th East 
Fortuna 
TOTALS 
Plaintiff's Total 
Cash Contributions 
$ 5,500.00 from savings 
prior to 
marriage 
5,000.00 sale of real 
estate with 
brother - given 
by father 
3,500.00 from mother's 
estate 
46,117.98 from L:ither's 
Defendant's Total 
Cash Contributions 
$ 1,500.00 from savings 
account 
-0-
5,129.55 from his 
estate, mother's savings 
estate and account 
monies earned 
working 
PLUS whatever amount 
should be credited 
to defendant for 
lending purchaser 
of 10th East home 
$5,400.00. 
$ 60,117.98 $ 6,629.55 plus ? 
Plaintiff's total contribution towards purchase was almost 
exactly nine (9) time as great as the defendants. 
$46,000.00 of the plaintiff's total $60,000.00 contribution, 
all of which came from private, separate sources (mostly her 
parents' estates) came within three (3) years of separation and 
four (4) years of final divorce. 
25 
Plaintiff total contribution $ 60,117.98 
Defendant total contribution * 6,629.55 
$ 66,747.53 
*credits nothing to defendant for lending 
purchasers of second home $5,400.00 
Court's findings as to 
value of Fortuna property 
at time of trial 
LESS cash contributions of 
parties 
TOTAL equity due to 
appreciation in all three 
homes 
$ 
$ 
117,000.00 
66,747.53 
50,252.57 
One half of $50,252.47 equals $25,126.24 
Plaintiff's contribution 
one-half total equity 
Defendant's contribution 
one-half total equity 
60,117.98 
25,126.24 
85,244.22 
6,629.55 
25,126.24 
31,755.79 
Defendant's equitable lien is in the amount of 
$32,606.00 
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A review of evidence outlined above clearly 
demonstrates that the lien amount awarded by the court below 
was squarely within the limits of it's decision making discretion 
and supported by the evidence. 
There is slight disagreement in the testimony of the 
two parties concerning the amounts each contributed toward the 
purchase of the various houses. No one knows how credible or 
incredibl~ Judge Banks found the parties' respective testimony 
on these points. Certainly the plaintiff appeared to be more 
certain in her testimony (compare plaintiff's testimony Tr. at 
19-27 with defendant's testimony Tr. at 121, 135-136). In any 
event the discrepancies in the testimony, even if resolved in 
the defendant's favor, make an insignificant difference. Even 
if the district court had believed the defendant's total 
contribution was in the amount of Ten Thousand Dollars 
($10,000.00), (which it apparently ~id not), the plaintiff still 
contributed six times as much money from separate sources as 
did the defendant. 
Virtually all of the plaintiff's contributions were 
from her sole and separate estate, and the vast majority of her 
contributions came within three (3) years of separation and four 
(4) years of final divorce. We have no way of knowing how the 
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ourt below divided the equity in the Fortuna home based on 
appreciation of all three homes, but it appears Judge Banks 
divided it equally. The defendant it appears in being awarded 
a Thirty Two Thousand Six Hundred Six Dollar ($32,606.00) lien 
is being allowed to share equally in the equity due to 
appreciation when he had invested only between one-seventh and 
one-tenth of the total monies invested by the parties. 
The court below heard testimony concerning property 
taxes paid by plaintiff, income taxes paid by defendant, 
defendant's arrearages in temporary child support, and unpaid 
bills left by the defendant at the time of the parties' 
separation. All of these matters were considered by the court 
and adjustments made in the defendant's equitable lien to 
compensate for them. 
of Fact.) 
(See paragraphs 7 and B of the Findings 
The defendant further complains in his brief that the 
court's published findings as to the parties' respective shares 
in the home were inadequate. The defendant, however, approved 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law published by the 
court previous to them being signed. The court clearly stated 
what it found concerning the defendant's equitable lien in the 
~ome, and on all other matters, (see Findings of Fact, paragraphs 
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7 and 8). The court was under no duty to state which test1mon. 
it found more credible or the arithmatic process it used ir' 
determining the defendant's lien. 
This court stated in 1977 in the case of Pearson v. 
Pearson, 561 P.2d 1080 that "findings of fact and conclusions 
of law will support a judgment even though they are very general 
if they follow the allegation of the pleadings in most respects." 
The findings of fact and conclusions of law in this case follow 
the pleadings and give significant detail as to what the court 
found. 
c. The Court's Ten Day_Delay In Ruling Did Not 
Prejudice Either Party. 
The trial in this matter was held on the 28th day of 
February, 1983. The trial began at nine o'clock a.m., and it 
took all day. At the conclusion of trial, the court indicated 
that it would not rule at that time, but that counsel would be 
informed as to when a ruling would be available. Ten days later, 
on March 10, 1983, counsel for plaintiff and defendant appeared 
at Judge Jay Banks chambers to receive the ruling in this 
matter. At that time Judge Banks referred to his notes and 
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,,i, 1 i shed it's findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree 
,f divorce in the matter. 
The defendant complains in his brief, at the bottom 
of page 8 thereof, that "the court's delay in ruling resulted 
in a serious prejudice to the appellant". 
There is no other reference to the delayed ruling in 
the defendant's brief, and not a shred of evidence is available 
to support such a proposition. Although the defendant claims 
that the court did not rule until some three weeks subsequent 
to the trial, in fact the ruling was ten days later, which 
includes one weekend. (Eight working days.) It is equally 
reasonable to believe that the additional time taken by the court 
permitted it to make a more thoughtful decision. 
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT IS NOT BOUND BY PROPOSALS MADE 
IN PLEADINGS WHEN THE SAME ARE ARGUED AND SUBMITTED FOR DECISION 
AT THE TIME OF TRIAL. 
The defendant states on page 15 of his brief, under 
Point IV thereof, that the court committed error in awarding 
thP plaintiff the tax deduction for the support of the parties' 
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minor child for calendar year 1982. The plaintiff had in her 
complaint offered the defendant, without exception, the deduction 
for said minor child for income tax purposes, (both State and 
Federal). The defedant argues that the plaintiff having made 
no motion to amend the pleadings at the time of trial to award 
the plaintiff the tax deduction for calendar year 1982, the court 
was powerless to do so, and committed error in granting said 
deduction to the plaintiff for the tax year that had then just 
passed. 
The trial in this matter was held in February, 1983. 
During the majority of the previous year the parties had been 
separated (Tr. at 14). 
The plaintiff paid the majority of the expense for 
the support of the minor child during the year in which the 
parties were separ3ted, (1982), (Tr. at 41 and 42), in that the 
child lived with her. The defendant contributed to the chiln 
support only minimally during this period. The defendant did 
pay pursuant to court order One Hundred Twenty Five Dollars 
($125.00) per month as temporary child support from July 20, 
1982, to the time of trial in February, 1983. At trial, however, 
the plaintiff was aw3rded child support in the amount of Two 
Hundred Dollars ($200.00) per month. 
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To assume, however, that this is the reason for the 
court's decision is speculation on the part of the plaintiff, 
The facts are simply that having considered all the 
evidence, and having the issue of the award of this claim for 
deduction before it at the time of trial, and having received 
no stipulation from the parties concerning the matter which the 
court had approved, the lower court ruled as it did, and there 
is no basis to amend that decision. In doing so the court 
committed no error. Rule 15 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure provides that, 
"When issues not raised by the pleading are 
tried by express or implied consent of the 
parties, they shall be treated in all 
respects as if they had been raised in the 
pleadings. Such amendments of the pleadings 
as may be necessary to cause them to conform 
to the evidence and to raise these issues 
may be made upon motion of any party at any 
time, even after judgment; but failure so 
to amend does not affect the result of the 
trial of these issues." [Emphasis added] 
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POINT IV. THE INHERITANCES RECEIVED BY THE PLAINTIFF 
DURING THE COURSE OF THE PARTIES' MARRIAGE, DID NOT BECOME PART 
OF THE MARITAL ESTATE. 
It is a clearly established point of law, that monies 
received by a woman in a marriage as an inheritance or gift are 
separate monies which are not merged into the marital estate. 
Article 22, Section 2, Utah State Constitution, Section 30-2-1, 
Utah Code Annotated, (1953, as amended). 
The monies received by Kathryn Newmeyer from her 
parents' estates, are, were at the time received, and remainei 
her personal, separate assets. All of the monies invested by 
the plaintiff in the purchase of the parties' three homes, except 
the Five Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($5,500.00) originally 
put down by the plaintiff on the Vitas Avenue home, came from 
private, separate sources, which were not part of the marital 
estate. 
The defendant's father was living at the time and he 
shall have whatever right is provided by him in his will, or 
through the laws of intestacy, to an inheritance from his 
estate To allow the defendant to share in the monies receivei 
by the plaintiff from her parents estates at the time of divorce, 
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•n1 then to subsequently allow the defendant to receive any 
inheritance he may receive from his parents estate, free from 
any claim of the plaintiff, would be fundamentally unfair. The 
trial court did not commit error in treating the plaintiff's 
private monies from inheritance which were invested in the 
parties real estate as her sole and separate funds. 
POINT V. THE AW~RD OF ONE DOLLAR PER YEAR TO THE 
PLAINTIFF AS ALIMONY WAS APPROPRIATE. 
In arguing that the plaintiff should not have been 
awarded one dollar ($1.00) per year alimony, the defendant cites 
the cases of Carter vs. Carter, 563 P.2d 177, and MacDonald 
vs. MacDonald, 236 P.2d 1066, 120 Utah 573. These cases, as 
they pertain to the instant case, stand for two major 
propositions. The first is that all things should be taken 
into consideration in awarding alimony, and the second that the 
wife's need for alimony is a part of the consideration, along 
with the husband's needs, both parties income, and both parties 
relative future earning capacity. 
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With these propositions of law, we agree. Defendant refer, 
many times in his brief to the fact that the plaintiff had been 
employed during a far smaller portion of the total period of 
the marriage than had the defendant. The testimony at the time 
of trial (Tr. at 123 and 124) was that the defendant has been 
almost continually employed during the marriage and has some 
trade skills as a mechanic, among others. The plaintiff, on 
the other hand, has never developed skills which have enabled 
her to make much more than minimum wage. The defendant has, 
at all times during the course of the marriage, (for which their 
is evidence concerning income), earned more money, and had a 
greater earning capacity than the plaintiff, and certainly did 
at the time of trial. The district court did not abuse it's 
discretion in awarding Mrs. Newmeyer alimony in the amount of 
One Dollar ($1.00) per year in terminating a marriage of 
approximately twenty (20) years. Judge Banks' decision is 
supported by the preponderance of the evidence as to the oarties 
relative income, needs and earning capacity. 
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POINT VI. THE AW~RD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES BY THE COURT 
BELOW WAS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE 
AWARDED FEES FOR DEFENDING THIS APPEAL. 
Defendant asserts that there was no evidence at the 
time of trial in support of the attorney's fees awarded the 
plaintiff. The defendant correctly states in his brief 
concerning the award of attorney's fees that "the only mention 
of attorney's fees during the entire time of the trial was that 
the plaintiff had paid the sum of Fourteen Hundred Twenty Two 
Dollars ($1,422.00)". (Tr. at 47 lines 11 through 13). 
Defendant cites a case recently decided by this court, 
namely Delatore vs. Delatore, Utah Supreme Court, decided 21st 
day of February, 1984, case no. 18625 (Green Sheets). Counsel 
for the plaintiff has examined the Delatore case, and would 
concede the issue but for the following points. In Delatore 
this court in dealing with the attorney's fees issue stated that, 
"The defendant complains that it was error 
for the trial court to award the plaintiff 
One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) attorney's 
fees, because the record is devoid of any 
evidence of testimony that it was a 
reasonable amount. ~e agree. The only 
reference in the record to attorney's fees, 
which has been cited to us by the plaintiff 
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were statements made by her counsel in his 
opening statement and in his closing argument 
that he was requesting Fifteen Hundred 
Dollars ($1,500.00). Those statements were 
insufficient." 
This Court goes on to explain in Delatore that, 
"This Court has consistantly held that an 
attorney's fees may not be awarded where 
there is nothing in the record to sustain 
the award either by way of evidence, or by 
stipulation of the parties, as to how the 
court may fix it". 
It seems to the plaintiff, Mrs. Newmeyer, that the 
real question ought to be, whether or not the court had a basis 
for determining the amount of time expended by her counsel, and 
what a reasonable fee for that amount of time spent would be. 
There was evidence before the court at the time of 
trial as to the amount of time which had been expended by 
plaintiff's counsel on her behalf. That evidence was before 
the court in the form of pleadings and other documents in the 
court's file. Judge Banks of the Third Judicial District Court 
has been on the bench many years. He has tried many divorce 
cases. The plaintiff feels that it is safe to say that the trial 
court below is familiar with the process by which cases are 
filed, brought to the point of being at issue, pretried by the 
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uurt's commissioner, and finally set for trial and tried 
rEsulting in a decision. 
The district court's file indicated at the time of 
trial that summons and complaint had been prepared, filed and 
served, that discovery in the form of a deposition had been done, 
that a Request for Trial Setting had been filed. The district 
court's file further showed that both parties had appeared at 
a pretrial before the court commissioner. The record further 
reflected that the matter had not been settled at pretrial and 
that a trial date had been set. The court at the time it made 
it's ruling was aware that both parties had appeared at trial 
and that roughly six (6) hours had been spent in trial. 
An interesting question arises. Who knows better, 
or is more familiar with what is a reasonable rate for an 
attorney to bill his time at, the attorney or a district court 
judge? Certainly not any individual attorney. Lawyers commonly 
take the stand and testify concerning the amount of time they 
have spent on cases, and that a reasonable rate in their opinion 
is blank number of dollars per hour. Most attorney's have no 
basis upon which to so testify, in that they have no real way 
of knowing what others charge. The district court judge, on 
rheo, other hand, hearing attorney's testify quite often as to 
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what they charge is in a unique position, in contrast to anyon~ 
else, to know how one attorney's fees compare to anothers, and 
what a reasonable hourly rate in the legal community is. 
At the time of trial Mrs. Newmeyer testified that she 
had already paid Fourteen Hundred Twenty Two Dollars ($1,422.00) 
in attorney's fees. It seems to the plaintiff that Judge Banks, 
having tried many divorce cases, and knowing what attorney work 
must have been involved from the court's file, and from having 
been at the trial himself, was in a unique position to be able 
to determine the reasonableness of the attorney's fee Mrs. 
Newmeyer testified she had actually paid. 
If plaintiff's counsel had testified in detail at trial 
that he had spend thirty five (35) hours on the case, and th3t 
he billed his time at One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) per hour, 
would the court have awarded the plaintiff Three Thousand Five 
Hundred Dollars ($3,500.00). We do not know. However, it seems 
unlikely. Why does it seem unlikely? Because the Judge seeing 
the court's file, and based on it's experience would have 
believed such a fee to be excessive. Why should there be a 
double standard? Judge Banks at the time of trial had evidence 
before him in the form of the court's file and oral evidence 
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c~m the plaintiff herself which if believed supports his 
J~cision as to attorney's fees. 
The plaintiff further requests that this matter be 
remanded to the district court for the purpose of determining 
3ttorney's fees to be awarded the plaintiff incurred in defending 
against this appeal. 
In a case recently decided by this court, namely; 
Carter v. Carter, 584 P2d 904, 906 (Utah 1978), the lower court 
had, on the husband's petition to modify a decree of divorce, 
partially granted said petition, and lowered alimony from Three 
Hundred Fifty Dollars ($350.00) per month to One Hundred Dollars 
($100.00) per month. The husband appealed, claiming the trial 
court should have totally eliminated the alimony. The 
wife-respondent on appeal defended against a further reduction, 
and requested of the court that she be awarded her costs of court 
and attorney's fees in defending against her husband's appeal. 
In Carter the court in granting the wife respondent costs and 
1ttorney's fees on appeal stated, 
"However inasmuch as the plaintiff (husband) 
was unwilling to abide by the trial court's 
ju~gment, and that she has been put to the 
necessity of defending this appeal, the 
plaintiff (husband) should have to bear the 
cost thereof, including reasonable attorney's 
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fees for her counsel. We agree with the 
reasonableness and propriety of her request. 
Therefore the case is remanded for the 
purpose of determining and awarding her such 
attorney's fees. . n 
In this case the defendant husband appeals the trial court's 
decision concerning equity in the parties' home when the evidence 
directly supports the findings of the trial court. The defendant 
seeks to terminate alimony of One Dollar ($1.00) per year to 
plaintiff after a twenty (20) year marriage. The defendant 
herein has refused to accept the lower courts judgment, when 
it was obviously reasonable, and thereby causing the plaintiff 
to incur additional fees to defend the lower court judgment. 
Plaintiff feels that defendant's appeal is frivolous and that 
she should be awarded her fees on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court has very broad limits set on it's 
discretionary powers, especially in a divorce case. Only where 
there is clear error of law, or abuse of discretion, should, 
or will this court intervene. 
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Judge Banks of the Third District Court made no errors of 
J~w in rendering his decision in the court below. The 
preponderance of the evidence supports the trial court's findings 
as to the value of the parties' home and the parties' respective 
equitable interests therein. 
The trial made adjustments to the equitable lien awarded 
the defendant to adjust for various small inequities in the 
division of personal property, taxes paid by one party, bills 
paid by another, et cetera. The lower court and published 
findings of fact and conclusions of law approved by the defendant 
as to substance and form and which meet statutory and common 
law requirements. 
The trial court was free to decide all issues raised in 
the pleadings, and which remained at issue at the time of trial, 
including the issue of which party should be awarded the 
deduction for supoort of the parties' minor child. 
The trial court correctly concluded that the money invested 
by the plaintiff in the parties' various homes remained her sole 
and separate property for purposes of computing the parties 
r~spective financial contributions in purchasing their various 
~om~s. 
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ThP lltil.3r1 of 1l1T1U:-'l'l ~J t-•-,., i1-i1r1t1ft ln l::_:1•:' 1m• 1 unt •It 
she has less earnin3 power, an hid c1lw1ys madP lpss money, 1:; 
clearly fair. 
The plaintiff's awarj of attorney's fees at trial was 
supported by hPr own testimony, the court's observation and the 
court's file. The plaintiff in any Pvent should be awarded her 
attorney's fees in defending ag~inst this appeal. 
This Court should review the evidence ani affirm the 
decision below in al oarticulars This Court should 
additionally remand this matter to the district court for thP 
purpose of taking evidence as to appropriate attorney's fees 
to be awardPd the plaintiff incurred in defending against this 
appe a 1. 
RESPECTFULLY SUB~fTTED this 12th day of Aoril, 1934. 
~ 
c-~~-~) /\ 11~~ 
Da '' i 1 'I.. ~c P 'l i", I's :i. 
Attorney for Resoondent 
CERTTFTC~TE 0F SERVICE 
>1 ' r e by c er t i f y th a t on the l 2th '.lay of ~pr i 1 , 1 9 8 4 , 
,, I - I r l i ·; e r e :l two ( 2 ) c o p i e s o f t h e f o r e g o i n g B r i e f o f 
' >n i 0 nt to Glen "l. Richm3n, attorney for .~ppellant at 50 Wt>st 
>11w'l'i" Fourth Floor, Salt L;ike City, Utah 84111. 
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